Full implementation of human rights requires a wide range of initiatives, many of which fall beyond the expertise of the UN human rights "mainland," consisting of the Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Specialized agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies have an indispensable role to play if the UN system is to engage with the entire spectrum of human rights implementation. Their role encompasses all human rights but is especially critical in relation to economic, social, and cultural rights. The Human Rights Council and OHCHR are mandated to promote human rights mainstreaming which is a precondition for full implementation. However, UN systemwide mainstreaming runs into the principles of functional decentralization 
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke for the last time to the Commission on Human Rights, he emphasized that "the era of declaration is now giving way, as it should, to an era of implementation."
1 The UN human rights system is often understood as the Human Rights Council, human rights treaty-bodies, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) . 2 This article calls this combination the UN human rights mainland and argues a UN human rights system consisting only of the mainland cannot adequately advance human rights in the "era of implementation." It suggests the UN human rights system should be understood as including the mainland and an archipelago of human rights initiatives across the organization. The archipelago is beginning to take shape through the emergence of human rights initiatives, beyond the mainland, in specialized agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies. These initiatives, which have an essential role to play in the "era of implementation," need sustained support, constructive scrutiny, and quality control of their human rights content. In short, the UN human rights system should be configured as the mainland and archipelago, otherwise the "era of implementation" cannot succeed.
How the UN human rights system is conceptualized determines how policy-makers, practitioners, and scholars approach human rights. A UN human rights system envisioned as the mainland will give rise to a number of strategies and methods. A UN human rights system envisioned as the mainland and archipelago will give rise to different strategies and methods. Numerous UN bodies, which are not part of the mainland, such as specialized agencies have a vital role in Annan's "era of implementation." Configuring the UN human rights system as including only the mainland excludes implementing organizations and initiatives that are crucial in this 1. U.N. Secretary-General, Address to the UN Commission on Human Rights (7 Apr. 2005), available at http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=1388. 2. In this article, the "Council" includes its subsidiary bodies, mechanisms, and processes.
for the promotion and protection of human rights. For example, OHCHR explains that it "works closely with UN specialized agencies, funds and programmes . . . to maximize the impact of human rights work." 16 However, "work [ing] closely with" is not the same as seeing these bodies as part of the UN human rights system.
In 1992, Philip Alston provided an early intimation of an alternative, more expansive view of the UN human rights system. In The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, he wrote that the international human rights regime "must also embrace . . . the authentically human rights-conscious UN agencies such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)."
17 ( We can assume that such UN agencies not only form part of the international human rights regime but also the UN human rights system.) Alston conceived of the UN human rights system as including the Commission (as it then was), treaty-bodies, and the human rights secretariat, as well as "authentically human rights-conscious UN agencies." More recently, Rosa Freedman took the same position: she wrote that the "UN Human Rights Machinery" includes "UN specialised agencies." 18 In 2014, Dinah Shelton edited The United Nations System for Protecting Human Rights that also has a large vision of what constitutes the UN human rights system. In her introductory chapter, Shelton writes:
The United Nations human rights system . . . consists of a network of norms addressing rights and obligations, together with institutions and procedures related to the promotion and protection of human rights. Beyond the treaty bodies and UN organs proper, this system embraces UN agencies such as the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization. 19 In short, Annan, Wille, Boyle, and (for the most part) OHCHR have a narrower conception of what constitutes the UN human rights system 16. Ohchr, cIvIl sOcIety space and the unIted natIOns human rIghts system, supra note 14, at 5. It should be added that a recent graphic on OHCHR's website for civil society places UN agencies, funds and programs within the UN human rights system, see http://myemail.constantcontact.com/United-Nations-Human-Rights---What-s-Happening--Weekly-Update-No-1---Jan-2017-.html?soid=1103337725730&aid=eNakKVDnchM. 17. Philip Alston, Appraising the United Nations Human Rights Regime, in the unIted natIOns and human rIghts, supra note 11, at 1. 18. rOsa freedman, faIlIng tO prOtect: the un and the pOlItIcIsatIOn Of human rIghts 50, 182 n. than Alston, Freedman, and Shelton. All share much common ground, in particular that the UN system encompasses the Council, treaty-bodies, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, underpinned by OHCHR. 20 This common ground is what this article calls the UN human rights mainland. Alston, Freedman, and Shelton agree that the UN human rights system is not confined to this mainland but also encompasses human rights initiatives within agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies. Scattered across the organization, these human rights initiatives are the UN human rights archipelago.
In summary, based on Shelton, the United Nations human rights system can be understood as a network of norms which include explicit human rights standards and commitments, combined with institutions, processes, and other arrangements, located within the United Nations, including its agencies, funds, programs, and similar bodies, which are closely related to the promotion and protection of human rights. In other words, the UN human rights system consists of the human rights mainland and archipelago.
III. WHAT DOES "IMPLEMENTATION" MEAN?
A year after the Secretary-General spoke about the "era of implementation," the General Assembly adopted the resolution establishing the Human Rights Council and mandating it to "[p]romote the full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States and follow-up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and protection of human rights emanating from United Nations conferences and summits." 21 In this new era, what is meant by "full implementation"? Kitty Arambulo observes that, in the context of international human rights, "implementation" has acquired the meaning of "supervision" or "monitoring." 22 This usage may derive from the early 1950s when the UN Commission on Human Rights spent much time discussing the "measures of implementation" for the draft international covenants on human rights, and the measures in question were varieties of international supervision, such as systems of periodic reporting and petition. 23 After the Commission agreed on supervisory procedures for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 20 . Or their historical equivalents, e.g., not the Council but its predecessor the Commission on Human Rights. 21. Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, supra note 3, ¶ 5(d 24 This is a very narrow understanding of the word. Arambulo adds that this meaning of implementation should not be confused with "implementation at the national level," such as "policy-making, the adoption of legislative measures, and . . . decisions of the national judiciary organs." 25 Implementation may be understood as efforts to administer legal action and policy directives. 26 These efforts include developing plans, programs, projects, practices, and other interventions or initiatives. The word "policy" implies a reasonably cohesive set of responses (i.e. not a collection of ad hoc initiatives) designed to address a long-term purpose or particular problem. 27 For example, the purpose or problem might be associated with human rights realization. Thus, in the present context, implementation includes laws, regulations, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, policies, plans, programs, projects, practices, and other interventions or initiatives that are designed to ensure the realization of human rights.
A. A Spectrum of Implementation
There is a spectrum of implementation efforts, each becoming more practical and specific in time and place, and "each successively more executive 24 . Philip . Dean Fixen and others define implementation as "a specified set of activities designed to put into practice an activity or program of known dimensions. According to this definition, implementation processes are purposeful and are described in sufficient detail such that independent observers can detect the presence and strength of the "specific set of activities" related to implementation. In addition, the activity or program being implemented is described in sufficient detail so that independent observers can detect its presence and strength. rather than legislative." 28 Legal implementation, such as passing laws and regulations, occupies one part of the implementation spectrum. Highlighting that legal implementation is likely to be necessary but not sufficient, some authors have identified two interrelated dimensions of implementation: laws and the operational delivery of human rights in communities and beyond. 29 Similarly, Benjamin M. Meier and William Onzivu, and Meier and Ana S. Ayala refer to the "operationalization" of human rights.
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As already noted, the Human Rights Council's mandate includes the promotion of "full implementation," a formulation which suggests that efforts confined to only one or two bands on the implementation spectrum, such as passing laws and regulations, will not suffice. Logically, a state may have only partially implemented an international human rights law.
B. Compliance
Although implementation and compliance are often conflated, they are conceptually distinct. Compliance may be defined as "conformity to rules."
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According to Jürgen Neyer and Dieter Wolf, "[a]ssessing compliance is restricted to the description of the discrepancy between the (legal) text of the regulation and the action and behaviors of its addressees."
32 Jana von Stein divides compliance into two categories: adherence to rules (first-order compliance) and adherence to rulings of judicial or other bodies (secondorder compliance). 33 If compliance is understood in this way, human rights require compliance and implementation. As with implementation, states may be in partial compliance. 34 28. Id. ¶ 11. The idea of a "spectrum of implementation" was inspired by the notion of a "spectrum of impact" in Rebekah 
C. Implementation and the UN Agencies: "Principles Into Practicalities"
When Shelton speaks of "UN organs proper," she alludes to the six principal organs which are central to the United Nations: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council (now suspended), International Court of Justice, and Secretariat. 35 Grouped around the UN "proper" organs are a large number of intergovernmental agencies, funds, programs, and other entities working in a range of economic, social, and cultural fields. 36 Within their mandates, these organizations provide states with expert policy guidance, technical assistance, capacity building, normative standards, accountability mechanisms, and some of them also provide financial help. For example, they may help states deliver health services (e.g. WHO), improve food security (e.g. the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)), provide decent work (e.g. ILO), promote literacy (e.g. UNESCO), and so on. Peter Baehr and Leon Gordenker call these organizations "operational" because, in their fields of expertise, they help states strengthen practical implementation. 37 With a few exceptions, most notably the ILO, the organizations do not explicitly and consistently use human rights language and analysis. However, if human rights were effectively mainstreamed into these organizations, they could serve as very powerful engines for the implementation of explicit rights to health, food, work, education, and other human rights.
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Consider Part IV of ICESCR, as it forms part of the International Bill of Rights. 39 Part IV (Articles 16-25) anticipates two major roles for specialized agencies. First, it gives them a central role in the Covenant's supervisory process. For example, agencies will report to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) about the progress made by state parties in relation to the Covenant's provisions 40 and also advise on "international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive implementation of the present Covenant." 41 Happily, ECOSOC has replaced this Part IV process with an immeasurably better supervisory system (i.e. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and its processes) which is in place today. 42 Nonetheless, it is instructive that the drafters of the International Bill of Rights gave a central role to specialized agencies in relation to ICESCR.
Also, Part IV of the Covenant includes an important provision which is independent of the now-replaced supervisory process. Article 23 says:
The States Parties to the present Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with the Government concerned. 43 It is clear from the wording (e.g. "the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance"), and from the context, that Article 23 anticipates specialized agencies will take "international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant." With a few exceptions, again most notably the ILO, specialized agencies have given little attention to Article 23. While the role of specialized agencies in relation to the Part IV supervisory system has been superseded, their role in relation to Article 23 has not. Alston observed that the "specialized agencies bring to their role under the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights a technical competence and expertise in relevant matters which is unmatched." 44 The abiding challenge is to find effective ways to harness this unrivalled competence and expertise for the "full implementation" of the Covenant.
Wilfred Jenks shed light on the relationship between specialized agencies and human rights implementation. One of the architects of the UN, Jenks attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945, contributed to the drafting of the International Bill of Rights, and served as Director-General of the ILO (1970 He elaborated that the ILO "translate[s]" Articles 6 to 10 of ICESCR "from principles into practicalities." 46 Articles 6 to 10 are on rights to work, rights in work, and some social welfare rights. Jenks concluded that "[t]he result is that the ILO becomes in practice, and is envisaged by the United Nations Covenant as being, the executing agency of these provisions of the Covenant." 47 He added that this could serve as a "prototype" in other fields, such as health, food, and education. 48 Jenks also emphasized the importance of Article 23 of ICESCR. 49 Occasionally, states remind agencies of their human rights responsibilities, for example, Norway recently highlighted that "specialised agencies are also mandated to promote a rights perspective."
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D. Conclusion
If implementation includes laws, regulations, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, policies, plans, programs, projects, practices, and other interventions or initiatives that are designed to ensure the realization of human rights, the UN human rights system, narrowly understood as the mainland, cannot adequately advance human rights in the "era of implementation." Much of the spectrum of implementation falls beyond the institutional competence, expertise, and capacity of the UN human rights mainland. For "full implementation," the mainland needs the institutional competence, expertise, and capacity of a wide range of agencies, funds, programs, and similar UN bodies. ICESCR and other treaties highlight the important role of agencies if international human rights are to be achieved. As Jenks put it, agencies were conceived as having the task of translating human rights "into practicalities." Describing the Norwegian position, Geir Sjøberg emphasizes "implementation is the responsibility of the UN system as a whole, not just the dedicated human rights institutions."
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In summary, the UN human rights system should be understood as including the mainland and an archipelago of initiatives in agencies, funds, programs, and similar UN bodies that are advancing the "full implementation" of human rights. Both mainland and archipelago have indispensable roles to play.
IV. MAINSTREAMING
The spectrum of implementation efforts, signaled in the preceding section, depends upon mainstreaming. It is impossible to implement fully human rights without their effective mainstreaming into law, policy, and practice. Effective mainstreaming is a precondition for the "full implementation" of human rights. Both the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights Council are mandated to advance human rights mainstreaming across the United Nations. In other words, Annan's "era of implementation" is also the era of mainstreaming.
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This section provides a critical introduction to UN human rights mainstreaming in general. Building on this platform, Section VI examines in more detail how some agencies and other UN bodies have endeavored to mainstream human rights in their activities. usually to bring an important or 'crosscutting' issue from the periphery to the center of policymaking or programming." 55 Zdzislaw Kędzia advises that human rights mainstreaming means "the integration of the international human rights standards and methodologies into the work of an organisation." 56 Christopher McCrudden explains: "By 'mainstreaming', I mean the reorganization, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making."
57 Gerd Oberleitner provides a fuller commentary, the core of which is that "human rights norms, standards and principles . . . must be incorporated in decisionmaking on policies, operational issues and budgets, be made part of an organisation's bureaucratic process, culture, and be internalised by staff. It means that organisations must operationalise abstract international norms."
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This article favors Oberleitner's description because it includes bureaucratic processes and also highlights the roles of operationalization, institutional culture, and staff internalization. However, all of these definitions, when applied to the United Nations, require the OHCHR and Council to reach out beyond the human rights mainland and advance the development of an archipelago of "authentic" human rights initiatives across the organization.
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B. OHCHR
Adopted in 1993, the General Assembly resolution establishing OHCHR does not mandate the High Commissioner to mainstream, but to "coordinate," human rights throughout the United Nations, an important distinction that is discussed in Section V. 60 The High Commissioner's explicit mandate to mainstream human rights across the United Nations was generated by Annan's three major reports on UN reform published between 1997 and 2005. 61 For example, his third report confirmed that "human rights must be mandates the Council to "address situations of violations of human rights" and "promote the effective coordination and mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system." 69 In other words, human rights mainstreaming is one of the Council's core mandated functions. This is a major departure because human rights mainstreaming was not a priority in the Commission's mandate. In 2007, the Council adopted an institution-building package which laid the foundations for its work, as well as the work of its mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). 70 Remarkably, this important document does not mention the Council's mainstreaming mandate.
In 2011, the Council conducted a five-year review of its work, implicitly recognized that it was not discharging its mainstreaming mandate, and agreed to hold a half-day high-level panel once a year on mainstreaming. 71 For the most part these annual panels of three hours have been disappointing. 72 Panelists usually have five minutes for opening remarks; states and others may contribute from the floor for two minutes; and panelists may make a few concluding remarks. After researching the panels of 2012 to 2015, Giulia Giannuzzi concludes that the "discussions mostly produce general and rhetorical statements and do not reveal an in-depth analysis of the issue of mainstreaming, the identification of challenges nor a thorough examination of best practices." 73 However, the Council has taken some important steps towards mainstreaming, for example, it adopted technical guidance on maternal mortality and morbidity (2012), as well as technical guidance on under-five mortality (2014). 74 By explaining how human rights can be integrated into specific policies and practices, both sets of guidance are major contributions towards human rights mainstreaming in health. Nonetheless, according to reliable commentators, the Council's mainstreaming record is weaker than the Com-mission's. 75 Since the Commission did not prioritize mainstreaming, while the Council's mandate does, this is extraordinary. Do the Council's "special procedures" promote mainstreaming? They contribute to part of the implementation spectrum, for example, by critiquing existing policies and programs and recommending new ones. However, they are not in a position to contribute to the full band-width of the implementation spectrum. Also, a special procedure is an accountability mechanism and this requires it to remain at arm-length from states and others so that, if necessary, it can report to the Council (and the world) that governmental or other policies are inconsistent with international human rights standards. The promotion of mainstreaming demands a different sort of relationship with states and others; it requires a closer, more collaborative partnership. So a special procedure can help to promote mainstreaming, but to a limited degree, something more is needed.
The relationship between UPR and mainstreaming is more complex. For example, it is necessary to distinguish between (a) civil and political rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights, and also between (b) the participation of civilian and military departments. 76 Both will be briefly considered in turn.
In most countries, ministries of justice and the interior are responsible for law and order, detention, trials, and issues around the rights to expression, assembly, and association. Moreover, these ministries are usually responsible for the implementation of civil and political rights. Implementation is often problematic, but civil and political rights are already familiar to many ministries of justice and the interior. During UPR, countries under review are often represented by politicians, policy-makers, and lawyers from these ministries. In short, the Council routinely engages with those responsible for civil and political rights and, in this way, may help to further implement and mainstream those rights.
Nevertheless, the situation in relation to ESCR is different. Rapporteur on the right to health, it was the author's experience that most ministries of justice and the interior had no understanding of the right to health whatsoever. It is unusual for government representatives and other individuals with health expertise to participate in UPR. So it is difficult for the UPR process to promote meaningful implementation and mainstreaming of the right to health with credibility or authority. Flavia Bustreo, WHO Assistant Director-General, has observed: "from the right to health perspective the UPR mechanism has been of very limited utility because the discussion . . . is always focused on civil and political rights." 77 This view tends to be supported by recent research from the Center for Economic and Social Rights that concludes: "ESCR [has] received much less attention [than civil and political rights] at every stage of the entire UPR process." 78 However, in their discussion of UPR, Kate Gilmore and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) researchers find that sexual and reproductive health and rights "is one of the most frequently cited issues in the UPR process." 79 Also, the recent research findings of Judith Bueno de Mesquita and Dabney Evans are closer to the UNFPA study than the Center for Economic and Social Rights research.
80 These apparent differences require more research. As Mesquita and Evans observe, they may arise from different methodologies, such as different definitions and classifications of various issues. 81 Nonetheless, while more research is needed, there is an argument that the current UPR participation and practice is better placed to contribute to implementation and mainstreaming of civil and political rights than ESCR.
The preceding remarks address UPR and civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in relation to civilian departments, such as ministries of justice and the interior. However, ministries of defense also have responsibilities for human rights implementation and mainstreaming. For example, the rights of detainees, as well as the prohibition against torture, cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, are highly relevant to the work of the military. Yet it is unusual for representatives of ministries of defense to participate in UPR. This limits UPR's capacity to promote meaningful human rights implementation and mainstreaming in ministries of defense, including 77 the development of a nuanced relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
In summary, the Council is the United Nations apex political body with specific responsibility for the promotion of human rights mainstreaming. To date it has done little to discharge this responsibility. The General Assembly gave the Council the historic role of providing political leadership for human rights mainstreaming, but it has yet to provide this leadership.
D. Country Selectivity by the Back Door? 82
The documents that place responsibilities on OHCHR and the Human Rights Council to mainstream human rights do not confine mainstreaming to development cooperation. For example, according to the resolution establishing the Council, it is required to promote "mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system" 83 -it does not add, "in relation to development cooperation." The United Nations has the responsibility to provide policy, technical, and other guidance for all countries. Moreover, human rights mainstreaming is a challenge for all countries, including high-income countries. However, there is a tendency for human rights mainstreaming to give particular attention to development, for example, in 2003 the UN agencies agreed upon the The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies, but the Understanding is confined to development cooperation. 84 If there is a focus on development, high-income countries largely escape attention. 85 One reason why the Council replaced the Commission on Human Rights was to eliminate country selectivity. The Council's key innovation, the UPR, was designed to avoid selectivity. Indeed, the resolution establishing the Council requires that its work shall be guided by several principles, including "non-selectivity." 86 93 Oberleitner, although in favor of human rights mainstreaming, highlights that it "may transform the simple and powerful message of human rights as a protective and empowering force into mere management tools." 94 While the author was working on this article, a senior diplomat observed that in his department they refer to mainstreaming as a way of "disappearing" an issue.
There are two main responses to these criticisms and comments. First, human rights have different roles for different actors in different contexts. Human rights may be insurrectional, inspirational, judicial, or operational. One group may denounce, another litigate, and another operationalize by way of mainstreaming. Mainstreaming does not rule out other human rights roles. As Oberleitner describes: "The dispersion of human rights norms into the management of a range of global concerns does not necessarily deny, or take away, their ('revolutionary') character as agents of change, but rather Second, like most tools, mainstreaming can be applied effectively or ineffectively. Effective human rights mainstreaming is complex, challenging, and contextual and will usually be a work-in-progress. Like human rights implementation, it requires monitoring, review, and quality control by suitably designed bodies.
The word mainstreaming, as an image, is misleading if it conveys the idea of human rights discourse, analysis, and concepts flowing into other fields of law, policy, and practice. 96 To mix metaphors, mainstreaming is better understood as a two-way street. For example, human rights mainstreaming requires that those working in the fields of health and human rights listen to, and learn from, each other with a view to enhancing the rights, dignity, and well-being of individuals, communities, and populations. Without careful attention to health discourse, analysis, concepts, and practice, the implementation of the right to health will be still-born. Implying such mutuality, Sarah McCosker calls for "practical 'interoperability'" between international human rights and humanitarian law.
97 By analogy, mainstreaming requires "practical 'interoperability'" between human rights and other fields of law, policy and practice. How this can be done without compromising international and national human rights law is one of the great challenges of human rights mainstreaming. However, it can only be achieved by way of respectful dialogue between all those concerned.
F. Conclusion
The "full implementation" of human rights depends upon effective mainstreaming. If human rights are to be mainstreamed within the United Nations, more clarity is needed about what mainstreaming means in this context. 98 According to their mandates, the mainstreaming responsibilities of the High Commissioner, OHCHR, and Human Rights Council are not confined to development.
This article aims to provide neither a comprehensive survey, nor an assessment, of OHCHR's mainstreaming activities. 99 Oberleitner reflects that when organizations, in response to the call for mainstreaming, "start producing internal documents-policy briefs, handbooks and guidelines-they contribute, in essence, to human rights standardsetting and to the clarification and interpretation of human rights norms." 101 In other words, effective mainstreaming accelerates the development of the UN human rights archipelago and challenges the narrow conception of the UN human rights system. Also, Oberleitner highlights that one of the reasons why human rights mainstreaming is a challenge is "because it means departing from the 1945 model of splitting up the management of the Global Commons to separate specialised agencies."
102 This crucial issue is discussed in the next section, before Section VI examines in more detail how some agencies and other UN bodies have endeavored to mainstream human rights in their activities.
V. THE UN, FUNCTIONAL DECENTRALIZATION AND AUTONOMY
Beginning in the 1930s, David Mitrany developed an approach to international organization known as functionalism. 103 He drew from the work of Leonard Woolf, as well as precedents such as the Universal Postal Union, established in 1875.
104 Mitrany was also inspired by the New Deal public works programs of US President Franklin Roosevelt, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, a new institution providing a specific public service and detached from the territorial basis of one state authority. 105 Romanian-born, Mitrany was employed by the British Foreign Office during World War II, and he developed the functionalist conception in a number of essays, such as A Working Peace System. 107 The "central feature of the functional approach is the creation of international agencies with limited and specific powers defined by the function that they perform." 108 The aim was to insulate international functional cooperation from security and political disputes between states.
Functionalism shaped the structure of the United Nations. 109 In 1950, Jenk's contrasted the UN with the League of Nations: "The constitutional arrangements of the United Nations, in contrast to those of the League, are based on a definite principle of decentralized authority."
110 This principle has system-wide application: "the architects of the United Nations deliberately based their work on the principle of functional decentralization, both within the central machinery of the United Nations and as the basis of the relations between the United Nations and the specialized agencies. 116 Article 57 provides that "various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. to as the "UN organs proper" and, crucially, the agencies are "brought into relationship with the United Nations." 118 In other words, the agencies are not "UN organs proper." As the US Secretary of State put it in his Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference following the negotiation of the UN Charter: "The design is clear: the specialized agencies are to be accorded the greatest measure of freedom and initiative compatible with purposeful and co-ordinated action on the part of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the agencies and organizations brought into relationship with them."
119 "It will be the function of the Organization," he added, "to co-ordinate rather than to control." 120 Although they are not specialized agencies, numerous funds (e.g. United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)), programs (e.g. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)) and other entities (e.g. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)) are important UN organizations. Consistent with functionalism, they have their own governing boards, programs of work and budgets, and enjoy a large measure of autonomy. As Samson explains, the UN system is "characterized by the existence of a series of distinctive organizations, each governed by its own constitution, with its distinctive competence, its own organs of government, its own programme, and its own budget."
121 Baehr and Gordenker liken specialized agencies to "fiefdoms."
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Of course, the states operating within these largely autonomous organizations are not above the law. For example, when states' representatives sit on an agency's executive board, they remain subject to the international and national law obligations entered into by their states. Luard, Clive Archer, and others have critiqued functionalism, for example, they have questioned the assumption that it is possible to separate functional and political issues. 124 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) have questioned the democratic credentials of agencies, while privatization and deregulation have challenged the public sector orientation of the original functionalist scheme. 125 Nonetheless, despite major problems and controversies, UN member states appear to see functionalist entities as "valuable instruments" to further their multilateral objectives.
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A. Coordination is not Mainstreaming 127
Functional decentralization and autonomy depend upon effective coordination within the UN. Based on Article 63(2) of the Charter, ECOSOC is the main intergovernmental coordination mechanism and the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)-formerly the Administrative Committee on Coordination-is the main bureaucratic coordination device. CEB describes itself as the "longest-standing and highest-level coordination forum of the United Nations system."
128 Despite these arrangements, Baehr and Gordenker refer to coordination as "perhaps a hopeless task" because of the United Nations "organizational tangle and interrelated activity."
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The coordination of human rights is layered onto these generic coordination arrangements. As already observed, the General Assembly mandated the High Commissioner to "coordinate" human rights throughout the United Nations in 1993, 130 and in 2006 it mandated the Council to promote the "coordination and mainstreaming" of human rights throughout the United Nations.
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Coordination and mainstreaming are conceptually distinct. Human rights coordination aims to organize the different human rights elements of a com- plex body, such as the United Nations, so they work together effectively.
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This has a neutral, administrative quality and is consistent with functional decentralization and autonomy. It means that, so far as there are existing human rights initiatives, they should be organized together effectively. On the other hand, human rights mainstreaming may be summarized as "the integration of international human rights standards and methodologies." 133 This is neither neutral nor purely administrative. It means that, where there are no human rights initiatives, they should be introduced in the relevant organizations. So far as this requirement originates from outside the organizations, it goes against the grain of functional decentralization and autonomy.
Effective UN human rights coordination is challenging, but at least the UN structure is designed for it. By contrast, the UN structure is not designed for system-wide mainstreaming mandated by the General Assembly and assigned to the Human Rights Council and High Commissioner for Human Rights. The UN structure of functional decentralization, autonomy, and "fiefdoms" makes the introduction of any system-wide initiative, such as mainstreaming, very challenging.
B. Conclusion
While a detailed critique of functionalism is beyond the scope of this article, for present purposes the key point is that the UN is structured around the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy, and strategies to mainstream human rights have to take into account these principles that are woven into the fabric of the United Nations. The UN structure of functional decentralization, autonomy, and "fiefdoms" makes the requirement of system-wide mainstreaming very difficult to achieve. If human rights are to become part of the culture of agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies, human rights have to be "owned" and internalized by each organization: they cannot be successfully introduced from outside. Agencies' governance bodies have to either drive, or at least approve, human rights mainstreaming. The chief executive of one UN body (i.e. OHCHR) telling twenty-eight chief executives from the other UN bodies that their organizations have to mainstream human rights is unlikely to be very effective. Consistent with the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy, it is the organizations' executive boards, usually controlled by states, which have to be persuaded. Effective and sustained human rights engagement with, and in, agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies, will require distinctive strategies and working methods that take account of functional decentralization and autonomy. The principles of functional decentralization and autonomy are not the only obstacles standing in the way of human rights mainstreaming. Some states are not politically committed to human rights, while others have ideological objections to some categories of human rights. Some obstacles are based on misunderstandings, for example, some stakeholders have grasped neither that international economic, social, and cultural rights are subject to progressive realization, nor that progressivity permits prioritization among these human rights, subject to various conditions. Some states and UN staff mistakenly think that mainstreaming will turn all UN officials into human rights enforcers and they are unaware of the growing evidence that integrating human rights into policies and programs contributes to gains for individuals and communities. 135 If there is to be effective human rights mainstreaming, these various political, ideological, and other obstacles will have to be addressed. However, this section focuses on functional decentralization and autonomy so that suitable strategies and working methods can be devised to navigate these structural constraints to human rights mainstreaming in the United Nations.
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VI. THE EMERGING UN HUMAN RIGHTS ARCHIPELAGO
Building on Section IV's general introduction to mainstreaming, this section outlines how four organizations or initiatives, which may form part of the emerging UN human rights archipelago, are mainstreaming human rights into some of their activities.
In Indeed, the Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly gives UNICEF a role. 142 Building on these foundations, UNICEF has used human rights to shape its activities, although some Executive Directors have been notably more enthusiastic than others. Since its early years, UNAIDS has deployed human rights in its work. In 1998, OHCHR and UNAIDS published the pioneering International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, described as "action-oriented measures to be employed by Governments in the areas of law, administrative policy and practice that will protect human rights and achieve HIV-related public health goals." 143 Other UN bodies also turned to human rights mainstreaming. In 2008, Oberleitner surveyed a decade of mainstreaming human rights in the UN. Mainly focusing on agencies, funds, and programs, he placed organizations in "circles of willingness" depending on the seriousness with which they mainstream human rights. 144 He found that ILO took mainstreaming most seriously and was the sole occupant of the innermost circle. While distinguishing between them, Oberleitner concluded that UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM (as it then was), UNHCR, UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and HABITAT "have found different answers to the call for mainstreaming human rights" and he placed them in the second circle. 145 According to Oberleitner, their "different answers" included "realign[ing] their mandates along human rights 139. undp, sOcIal and envIrOnmental standards 9 (2014), available at http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/operations1/undp-social-and-environmental-standards. html. 140. marta santOs paIs, a human rIghts cOnceptual framewOrk fOr unIcef (1999) Although an updated version of Oberleitner's survey is urgently needed, it is clear from his work, as well as Section IV of this article, that there are numerous organizations or initiatives lying beyond the UN human rights mainland, which may form part of the emerging human rights archipelago. The ILO is chosen because it is a major specialized agency with the longest record of serious human rights engagement. HRuF is included because, although it lies beyond the mainland, it is not part of an agency, fund or program, but located within the Office of the UN Secretary-General in New York. WHO's Gender, Equity and Rights Team is selected because it is a fledgling initiative of a major agency which, throughout most of its history, has had a fraught relationship with human rights. Lastly, a cluster of human rights initiatives within the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is included for a number of reasons, not least because one of the initiatives is an independent human rights complaints mechanism.
Importantly, the assessments made here are only preliminary and provisional; they are neither comprehensive nor definitive. Criteria still have to be developed for an authoritative assessment of whether or not an organization or initiative is authentic from the human rights perspective.
151 Also, the illustrations do not include an evaluation of the impact of the organizations or initiatives. 
A. International Labour Organization
The ILO is the most obvious candidate to be part of the UN human rights archipelago. Oberleitner observes "that the ILO, in a sense, paved the way for the creation of the UN human rights regime [and this] puts it in a different category than other UN institutions."
153 As already noted, Jenks, DirectorGeneral of the ILO in the 1970s, saw the ILO as "the executing agency" of several provisions of the International Bill of Rights. 154 In 1992, Virginia Leary wrote that the ILO "has the most highly developed intergovernmental system for the protection of human rights, but scholars and activists conversant with the human rights activities of the UN remain surprisingly ill-informed concerning its work."
155 Both aspects of this statement probably remain valid today. Leary argued that the ILO "has made a major contribution to theory and practice by its 'holistic' or integrated approach to human rights."
156 In 2013, Lee Swepston agreed with much of Leary's assessment but took the (surprising) view that it was not until the 1990s that "the ILO moved firmly into the human rights arena when it adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights to Work." 157 The ILO has nearly 200 Conventions and an equal number of Recommendations, many of them detailed and practical, on a wide range of labor and social issues. The Organization has designated eight of these Conventions as its core human rights instruments on issues such as forced labor, freedom of association, equal pay, and child labor.
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Beyond these core human rights ILO Conventions, there are many others with substantive human rights content, such as ILO Convention No. 169 on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. 159 In short, the ILO definitely contributes to setting human rights standards.
The ILO has several accountability mechanisms, such as its Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, consisting of twenty independent experts. Committee members routinely consider states' reports, as well as the comments of national employers' and workers' organizations, with explicit human rights content. 160 The ILO also has a complaints procedure for alleged violations of freedom of association. 161 for human rights implementation, one of the key functions of the ILO is to help states, by way of technical assistance (e.g. training, draft legislation and employment policy), to implement the Conventions and Recommendations, including those with explicit human rights content.
Oberleitner concludes that, while the ILO has a unique tripartite structure of governments, employers' organizations, and workers' organizations, which cannot easily be replicated, it provides important lessons on mainstreaming human rights in international organizations: detailed legal obligations together with a multi-faceted supervisory system and a targeted programme of technical assistance; engagement of non-State actors; systematic, regular and consistent supervision of obligations; and a holistic approach which avoids a clear-cut separation between civil-political and socioeconomic rights [that] are likely ingredients for success. 162 In these circumstances, there are compelling reasons to regard the ILO as part of the UN human rights archipelago.
B. Human Rights up Front
The HRuF initiative was launched by the UN Secretary-General in 2013. 163 The catalyst for HRuF was Charles Petrie's report commissioned by the Secretary-General which assessed the United Nations response to the final months of the 2009 war in Sri Lanka. 164 In a stinging analysis, Petrie found "a continued reluctance among [UN Country Team] institutions to stand up for the rights of the people they were mandated to assist." 165 The report concluded that the United Nations "systemic failure" had seven elements, one of which was "a UN system that lacked an adequate and shared sense of responsibility for human rights violations." 166 Although this report triggered the HRuF, the initiative's origins may also be traced to the UN failures in relation to the Rwandan genocide and Srebrenica massacre.
From the outset, HRuF "focused primarily on the UN Secretariat, Major themes in the action plan include UN entities' engagement with states and other "influential stakeholders, including from civil society"; 169 human rights capacity building; 170 and "information management systems on violations of human rights and humanitarian law."
171 Senior management will have "leadership obligations to defend and promote human rights" 172 and all "UN entities will use existing tools to hold accountable staff, particularly those in the most senior positions, for fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law." 173 The plan anticipates a significant role for OHCHR, for example, the Office "will coordinate the development of a mandatory induction for UN staff at all levels, up to and including the Under Secretary-General level, on the UN's human rights responsibilities." 174 Since the plan's adoption, the Secretary-General has emphasized that HRuF "should lead to the prevention of human rights violations." 175 In 2016, when discussing with the General Assembly, the Deputy Secretary-General emphasized: "Prevention is the fundamental premise and vocation of Human Rights up Front."
176 Located in the Office of the Secretary-General, two or three staff members are responsible for driving HRuF's plan of action.
In her brief assessment of the plan of action, Kristen Boon highlighted some omissions, for example, its silence on the initiative's relationship with the responsibility to protect. Nonetheless, she formed the view that the plan "represents an important step forward for human rights at the UN. that HRuF is "a promising initiative" although "implementation has been checkered so far." 178 In a recent independent assessment, Gerrit Kurtz found the "initiative has had a promising start, but . . . must overcome agency competition, reconcile differences in institutional cultures and involve constructive member states more closely." In conclusion, HRuF is designed explicitly to prevent, and respond to, serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, and to strengthen the UN internal accountability for human rights. An initiative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, a key issue for the future will be the level of political and logistical support provided by his successor. However, for the time being there is a prima facie case that HRuF is part of the emerging UN human rights archipelago.
C. WHO's Gender, Equity, and Rights Team
Benjamin Meier and his colleagues provide important insights into human rights mainstreaming in WHO since 1948. 181 The fortunes of human rights, which have ebbed and flowed as Director-Generals have come and gone, will not be summarized here. 182 in WHO remained marginal and contested, despite the remarkable efforts of a small handful of highly committed officials. When Margaret Chan was Director-General, between 2006 to 2017, she made major changes to human rights mainstreaming in WHO. First and foremost, she linked human rights with equity, gender, and social determinants, and required them to be mainstreamed together across the Organization. 183 A Gender, Equity and Rights (GER) team was launched at the World Health Assembly in 2012. Located within the Family, Women's and Children's Health cluster, the GER team spearheads the mainstreaming of gender, equity, and human rights in headquarters, six regional offices, and country teams: this is an extremely challenging undertaking. 184 The team works closely with a separate unit on social determinants of health. At headquarters, a Team Leader and three technical officers comprise the team, one of each for gender, equity, and human rights. In regions and countries, the work is usually managed by staff on a part-time basis. The GER team fosters, and relies very heavily upon, collaborative departmental networks across the Organization. 185 
WHO has adopted a Roadmap for Action (2014-2019): Integrating Equity, Gender, Human Rights and Social Determinants into the Work of WHO.
186 Aligned with WHO's existing priorities, such as universal health coverage and noncommunicable diseases, the Roadmap has three main pillars: institutional and programmatic mainstreaming (i.e. "the transformation of an organizational culture from within"), 187 health inequality monitoring and data disaggregation, and country support for mainstreaming. In its work, the GER team explicitly draws from international human rights treaties and UN human rights treaty-bodies, such as CESCR's General Comment 14 on the right to health. 188 The team has recently published its report on its activities during 2014 to 2015 and recounts achievements in headquarters, the regions, and countries. 189 It is not possible to summarize or evaluate these achievements here, but they include the integration of GER perspectives in the WHO program budget for 2016 to 2017, placing GER in mandatory induction for all new staff in headquarters, contributing to the delivery of a Health Equity and Human Rights course in Cairo for participants from WHO's Eastern Mediterranean Region, technical support for deepening human rights content in several national health polices, and publication of Anchoring universal health coverage in the right to health. 190 As the report puts it: "Institutional mainstreaming mechanisms, capacity building and direct country support are the hallmarks of mainstreaming advances in the 2014-2015 biennium."
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Linking human rights, equity, social determinants, and gender is controversial. Meier and Onzivu have reported that "the integration of human rights among normative frameworks for gender and equity has been viewed by critics within and outside WHO as diminishing the role of international human rights law as a basis for global health governance."
192 Their concern is that integrating a legal framework (i.e. international human rights law) with non-legal frameworks (i.e. gender and equity) diminishes the legal status of international human rights. On the other hand, equity, social determinants, and gender have much greater currency, within global health, than human rights. Thus, linking human rights, equity, social determinants, and gender can be seen as either a devious device to diminish binding international human rights law, or a shrewd strategy by which equity, social determinants, and gender provide a vehicle for effective human rights implementation in the health sector. It is too early to assess which view is more accurate. More evidence is needed.
Of course, the team's claims about its activities in 2014 to 2015 need careful scrutiny. However, the GER initiative appears to be making a contribution to human rights mainstreaming in WHO. It uses explicit human rights language and analysis, has staff and resources (albeit too few), is delivering some human rights activities, and enjoys a degree of high-level support within the organization. On the other hand, WHO does not yet have a formal human rights policy, in contrast to some of its regional offices, such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 193 Nonetheless, there is a prima facie case that the GER initiative is part of the emerging UN human rights archipelago.
D. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria ("Global Fund")
Although the Global Fund is not formally part of the UN, it is briefly included here because it is a partnership and financing mechanism that implements UN technical guidance on the three diseases, UN bodies are represented in its governance structures, it works closely with UNAIDS, WHO, UNDP, and World Bank at the operational level, and it has recently established an independent human rights complaints process which explicitly includes UN human rights mechanisms. 194 The Global Fund was established in 2002 to direct resources to countries to support their response to AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. In 2013, "it was the main multilateral funder of health programs, investing in more than 140 countries and disbursing between two and three billion [US] dollars a year." 195 The Fund's Board "is composed of representatives from donor and implementing governments, [UN bodies,] civil society in both developed and developing countries, the private sector, private foundations, and affected communities." 196 Human rights advocates and members of communities living with and affected by HIV and TB became alarmed that some programs supported by the Global Fund were violating human rights. 197 The Board adopted a new strategy for 2012 to 2016 with five objectives, one of which is to protect and promote human rights through three strategic actions: to ensure that the Fund does not support programs that infringe human rights; to integrate human rights considerations, including nondiscrimination, gender equality, participation, transparency, and accountability, throughout the grant cycle; and to increase investment in programs that address rightsrelated barriers to access, including those relating to gender inequality. 198 Steps were taken to ensure delivery of these actions, for example, human rights staff were appointed, a Human Rights Reference Group to provide expert guidance was established, staff were trained in human rights, the Board's strategy committee approved a process to put the human rights strategy into practice, briefings for applicants were prepared, 199 and human rights grants have been made. 200 In November 2015, for example, the Fund secured a $10.5 million (USD) grant "to address human rights barriers faced by vulnerable communities . . . and facilitate access to lifesaving health care" in ten African countries.
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The Global Fund has a grant agreement that establishes its expectations for all the programs it supports. Five minimum human rights standards are now part of the grant agreement: "non-discriminatory access to services for all, including people in detention; employ only scientifically sound and approved medicines or medical practices; [do] not employ methods that constitute torture or that are cruel, inhuman or degrading; respect and protect informed consent, confidentiality and the right to privacy concerning medical testing, treatment or health services rendered; and avoid medical detention and involuntary isolation, which, consistent with the relevant guidance published by the World Health Organization, are to be used only as a last resort."
202
In November 2014, as part of the roll-out of the new provisions in the grant agreement, the Fund decided to establish a human rights complaints procedure, building on existing whistle blowing procedures for fraud and corruption. 203 If someone believes that they have either experienced or witnessed a violation of any of these five human rights standards in a Global Fund-financed program, he or she can file a complaint with the Fund's Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 204 The OIG is independent of the Fund's secretariat and accountable to the Board. An organization may file a complaint on behalf of an individual or group that is directly affected, provided it has a letter of authorization. 205 The OIG's investigations may include conducting witness interviews and collecting documentation and other evidence.
206 "In interpreting the results of the investigation and assessing whether there has been a violation of the relevant human rights standard, the OIG will be guided by international human rights law. the investigation finds a failure to comply with the minimum human rights standards this may lead to follow-up actions, such as discussing with senior government leaders, technical assistance, and issuing a public statement.
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A "material breach" 209 can trigger the remedies set out in the grant agreement, for example, as a last resort the Fund may "decide to restrict the use of Grant Funds to finance non-compliant Program Activities." 210 No part of the UN human rights mainland has at its disposal a comparable financial sanction when a duty-bearer fails to comply with international human rights standards. If the OIG finds a complaint is eligible for investigation, but it is not feasible for the Office to take further action, for example, for security reasons, the Office may, with the consent of the complainant, share the information "with the relevant UN human rights mechanisms (such as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health)."
211 According to a report submitted to the Global Fund Board in November 2015, since January 2015, nine human rights-related complaints were raised, three of which were being investigated under the new human rights complaints procedure. The remaining six were being considered through other OIG procedures because they did not meet the complaints procedure's eligibility criteria.
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In recent years, the Global Fund has adopted a strategy prioritizing human rights, appointed a small human rights team, explicitly placed some human rights into its grant agreement, and established an independent human rights complaints process. There is a prima facie case that the Global Fund's cluster of human rights initiatives is de facto part of the emerging UN human rights archipelago.
E. CONCLUSION
None of the four organizations or initiatives considered here falls within the narrow conception of the UN human rights system. 213 Yet they are all using explicit human rights language in pursuit of one or more of the objectives associated with human rights in the United Nations: human rights standard-setting; responding to, and preventing, human rights violations; human rights implementation, including mainstreaming; or accountability for human rights. Their human rights work appears to be neither slight nor rhetorical. They have resources, although very few, 214 and political support. Those that are part of a larger organization are integral to it; they are not flying below the radar. Each is part of the UN "family," with the possible exception of the Global Fund. If an unpaid Special Rapporteur, supported by an OHCHR member of staff, is part of the UN human rights system, it is unclear why the four organizations or initiatives may not also be part of the UN human rights system. In short, the emergence of the archipelago means the narrow conception of the UN human rights system has been overtaken by practice and is now outdated.
Jenks envisaged UN bodies, such as ILO, would have the responsibility to translate human rights "from principles into practicalities."
215 This is what the four organizations or initiatives are endeavoring to do in their different activities and spheres of influence. They are often aiming to make human rights standards more operational, a process that usually requires a degree of specialist competence and expertise. In other words, most of their work is towards the executive end of the implementation spectrum.
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A common feature of all four illustrations is that they are helping to mainstream and internalize human rights standards in their organizations or sectors, such as the UN secretariat (via HRuF), WHO (via GER), and the Global Fund (via its cluster of human rights initiatives). Consistent with the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy, they are doing this from within their respective organizations.
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The four organizations and initiatives give rise to serious questions. For example, is it realistic to expect two or three staff members to drive such an important and ambitious initiative as HRuF? Effective mainstreaming requires a balance between bureaucratization and practical genuine implementation: is GER striking the right balance? The Global Fund's human rights complaints procedure is grounded on five minimum human rights standards, what about the other legally binding international and national human rights standards?
However, neither is the mainland free from serious questions from the human rights perspective. Why did the Council do so little to deliver its core mainstreaming mandate in its first decade? If a treaty-body considers a country for six hours once every five years, and it has ten key articles to review, one of which is the right to health, and it devotes roughly equal time to each article, this means it has 36 minutes every five years to consider a country's entire right to health record-is this credible?
218 Current members of CESCR are highly eminent in their fields of expertise, most are exceptionally experienced lawyers and none has a qualification in health 219 -does this diminish CESCR's authority among health professions, just as an oversight body of the right to a fair trial might be diminished among lawyers if the body consists of dermatologists and dentists? 220 In summary, this section is not arguing that the four organizations and initiatives are adequate or satisfactory from the human rights perspective; it is suggesting that, on the basis of a preliminary and provisional assessment, they appear to have reached a minimum human rights threshold and may be regarded as part of the emerging UN human rights archipelago. Not all UN human rights initiatives merit such a cautiously positive assessment, for example, Barrett and Nowak have argued convincingly that "human rights have received little more than lip service in the UN drug control system" which includes the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, International Narcotics Control Board, and UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 221 Finally, the emerging UN human rights archipelago raises issues of quality control and coherence. What can be done to help agencies ensure their human rights initiatives are consistent with international human rights standards? Başak Çalı, Lorna McGregor, and Ivana Radačič observe that "a major concern for international human rights law is how to master the exponential growth in international human rights standards and norms, jurisprudence, actors and institutions, often with competing or nuanced 218. Although this is based on the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the point being made (i.e. the inadequacy of treaty-body review of countries) has wide application. 219. According to an examination of members' biographies, available at http://www.ohchr.
org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx. 220. This criticism is not confined to CESCR. Importantly, since 1990, CESCR has made, and continues to make, an enormous contribution to the jurisprudence of international economic, social, and cultural rights. The Committee has cemented the place of economic, social, and cultural rights in international human rights. However, CESCR is subject to constraints, such as insufficient time to do its job and a membership which is not professionally diverse. Notably, these constraints are not the fault of CESCR. States determine the number and length of CESCR sessions and they elect CESCR members. differences in their articulation and interpretation of the law." 222 They warn this growth "leads to internal fragmentation and the increasing emergence of sub-communities" specialized in particular areas of international human rights law, 223 and they conclude that "internal fragmentation raises serious questions about the coherence and unity of international human rights law." 224 With these important points in mind, the next section includes a way to promote quality control (or "authenticity") and coherence in the emerging UN human rights archipelago.
VII. WAYS FORWARD
In the "era of implementation," a key challenge is to accelerate the emergence of the human right archipelago by internalizing or indigenizing human rights within all agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies, subject to suitable quality control. This requires the international human rights community to give much more serious and sustained attention to what lies beyond the mainland. States supportive of mainstreaming, institutions in the mainland, civil society groups, experts, activists, and scholars will have to give a higher priority to the executive boards and assemblies of agencies and similar UN bodies, while also working closely with chief executives and senior management. In many of these bodies, it will be difficult, and take time, to indigenize human rights. 225 Given functional decentralization and autonomy, inhabitants of the UN human rights mainland will need to be sensitive to the cultures, concepts, institutions, and procedures of agencies and other UN bodies, and forge constructive relationships with the archipelago. They will have to engage in "practical 'interoperability'" i.e., listen to, and learn from, other fields, without compromising international and national human rights law. 226 When appropriate, the mainland should welcome, encourage, foster, support, and scrutinize the archipelago. The mainland is not diminished by the archipelago; on the contrary, the archipelago is a measure of the mainland's success.
Human rights mainstreaming within the United Nations cannot be dissociated from human rights mainstreaming within governments. The governance structures of agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies vary but, to one degree or another, they are controlled by states. There can be no meaningful mainstreaming in agencies without a green light from at least some states. State delegates sitting on agencies' governance bodies are often from ministries in capitals, such as education, housing, and health. These delegates may hesitate to approve effective human rights mainstreaming in an agency unless there is at least some familiarity with, and support for, human rights within their national ministries. This has far-reaching implications. States will have to take steps to dismantle national silos and ensure their delegates in the mainland, and their delegates in agencies, adopt consistent positions on human rights. Tackling "disconnected" government is difficult and has major implications for national ministries, national human rights institutions, and civil society in countries.
Numerous steps are needed to advance implementation, mainstreaming, and the development of the UN human rights archipelago. This article does not attempt to outline a strategy for addressing all these complex issues. Instead, it outlines three ways to advance this agenda, beginning with the working methods of the Human Rights Council.
A. New Working Methods for the Council
During the "era of declaration," the UN human rights mainland negotiated an extensive international human rights code of numerous treaties, declarations, guidelines, and other instruments. By a remarkable feat of imagination, it also designed a number of mechanisms to hold states accountable for their obligations arising from the international human rights code. Today, in the Human Rights Council, these accountability mechanisms include the confidential complaints procedure, country and thematic special procedures, the UPR, and commissions of inquiry. Among treaty-bodies, the accountability mechanisms include periodic reporting, complaints procedures, inquiries, and unrestricted visits to places where persons are deprived of their liberty. These international accountability mechanisms were established despite the principle of state sovereignty and Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. Although the code is not comprehensive and its accountability mechanisms are deeply flawed, they have been described as "monumental achievements." The working methods inherited by the Human Rights Council in 2006 were designed for the "era of declaration," for example, working groups for drafting instruments and the confidential complaints procedure and "special procedures" for holding states accountable. In addition, the Council was given two new accountability mechanisms, UPR, and commissions of inquiry. These working methods can only partly contribute to the promotion of the "full implementation" and mainstreaming of human rights. 228 Also, a case can be made that UPR is more effective for the implementation and mainstreaming of civil and political rights than it is for ESCR.
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The UN human rights mainland urgently needs new and effective working methods that are designed for the "era of implementation." One possibility is outlined in the next paragraphs.
B. Intersessional Human Rights Council Mainstreaming Working Group
Just as the Commission on Human Rights had to imagine and establish working methods for holding states accountable, today the Council has to imagine and establish effective working methods for its implementation and mainstreaming mandates. The challenges faced by the Commission in the "era of declaration," and by the Council in the "era of implementation," are of comparable importance and magnitude.
Whatever form the new working methods might take, the Council needs to establish a supportive, collaborative process with five features:
By way of illustration, one approach might be an intersessional Human Rights Council Mainstreaming Working Group with these five features. If invited, the Working Group would attend a UN agency, such as one of its governing bodies; report on developments in the Council, which relate to the agency's work; and also learn about the agency's implementation and mainstreaming achievements, challenges, and next steps. In this way, the Working Group would discuss, and provide support to, the human rights
mainstreaming units, which several UN agencies have already established. Because agencies have universal membership, this approach is consistent with the Council's principle of non-selectivity. 230 The Working Group's composition could be adjusted depending upon the agency in question. For example, if invited to discuss human rights implementation and mainstreaming with the WHO Executive Board, or World Health Assembly, the Working Group might wish to include one or two ministers of health among its membership. If invited to discuss with a governing body of FAO, the Working Group might adjust its composition. Crucially, the Working Group would complement and support the technical expertise on implementation and mainstreaming already provided by OHCHR and the secretariat in other agencies. One of its responsibilities would be to promote the coherent and consistent application of international human rights, as well as the formulation of authentic human rights initiatives, across the archipelago. 231 The Working Group is an illustrative method for the promotion of implementation and mainstreaming. Whether or not it is the best way forward, the Council needs some sort of purposive, practical, targeted, and sustained process which collaboratively engages with UN agencies' governing bodies and staff, with a view to the promotion of the "full implementation" and mainstreaming of human rights. Presently, the Council has over forty thematic special procedures with the primary task of holding states accountable. 232 text, Alston warns against "epistemological misappropriation" when "the discourse of international human rights law" is used "to describe an agenda which has a fundamentally different ideological underpinning." 234 In short, human rights implementation, mainstreaming, and the archipelago need to be subject to some form of quality control. Criteria are needed to decide whether or not the organization or initiative can properly be regarded as authentic from the human rights perspective.
In this context, it is necessary to distinguish two questions. One, what criteria should be used to assess whether or not an organization or initiative is authentic from the human rights perspective? Two, how effective is the human rights organization or initiative, i.e., what is its impact? Although both questions are important, this section focuses on the first.
When assessing whether or not an initiative is authentic from a human rights perspective, and thus might form part of the UN human rights archipelago, three steps are suggested.
First, does the initiative contribute to human rights standard-setting; responding to, and preventing, human rights violations; human rights implementation, including mainstreaming; or accountability for human rights? These are among the key objectives of the UN human rights mainland and it is logical that a putative human rights initiative should contribute to at least one of them, subject to an important condition: the human rights element must be explicit. For example, an initiative that contributes to human rights implementation, but not human rights standard-setting, might be authentic, provided the implementation explicitly uses human rights language and analysis.
The reference to "human rights standard-setting" requires clarification. It is not the responsibility of the archipelago to create new human rights: this remains the responsibility of appropriate bodies in the mainland in accordance with suitable processes. 235 However, as already discussed, agencies and similar UN bodies have unmatched competence and expertise to translate existing human rights into practice, including by way of detailed, specific, operational guidelines, such as the "action-oriented" International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights published by OHCHR and UNAIDS. 236 The reference to "human rights standard-setting" in the previous paragraph alludes to operational standard-setting derived from existing human rights norms.
Second, is the initiative consistent with the The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding Among UN Agencies which UN agencies agreed upon in 2003?
237 Although the focus of the Understanding is development cooperation, and human rights mainstreaming is not confined to development, 238 the principles identified in the Understanding have wider application. In brief, the Understanding advises that relevant programs, policies, and technical assistance should (a) further the realization of international human rights, (b) guide all programming, and (c) contribute to the development of the capacities of duty-bearers to meet their obligations and/or rights-holders to claim their rights. 239 Third, more specifically and practically, it is suggested that an authentic human rights initiative will usually be evidenced by:
• Human rights leadership from senior officers in the relevant organization, e.g., public statements, in support of human rights, by the chief executive.
• A human rights policy adopted by a high-level body within the relevant organization.
• The integration of this high-level policy into all phases of programming.
• Adequate resources to support the human rights initiative, including staff.
• Constructive engagement with international and national human rights bodies, such as Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, national human rights institutions, and civil society organizations.
• A periodic independent review of the mainstreaming initiative (e.g., by a UN Special Rapporteur or other suitably qualified independent person or entity), reporting to appropriate political bodies (e.g., executive board of the organization responsible for the initiative and Human Rights Council); independent review is needed to help ensure the initiative appropriately applies human rights standards.
• From the outset, multi-disciplinary and multi-method evaluation to capture the impact (or effectiveness) of the mainstreaming initiative.
Human rights mainstreaming is usually a work-in-progress. It is likely to be rolled-out progressively, gradually encompassing additional programs and projects. Even if mainstreaming is not yet agency-wide, the agency may nevertheless have some initiatives that are authentic from a human rights perspective. Large organizations are rarely homogenous. WHO, for example, consists of its headquarters in Geneva, six largely autonomous Regional Offices, and more than 100 country teams. Consequently, one may decline to call WHO a human rights organization, but content to regard some of its initiatives as authentic from the human rights perspective, 240 and therefore willing to regard these initiatives, rather than WHO as a whole, part of the UN human rights archipelago. Exceptionally, human rights may be so comprehensively and effectively embedded throughout an organization that it is credible to regard it as a human rights organization. The ILO may be such an exception.
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D. Research and Guidance
There is a need for research and guidance to support human rights mainstreaming in the United Nations, including the following.
One, a mapping of the UN system to identify existing human rights initiatives that may form part of the archipelago.
Two, in his research on the United Nations, Oberleitner found "the results of mainstreaming human rights are uneven, ill explored and the whole process is still little understood."
242 He concluded there is "a number of mutually beneficial consequences of mainstreaming human rights." 243 He cautioned "that this judgement rests to a large extent on the self-assessment of a small number of organizations rather than on a thorough external review based on sound empirical methodology" 244 and so he emphasized that his positive assessment "will have to be scrutinized more scrupulously." 245 In short, studies are needed to assess the impact of existing UN human rights mainstreaming initiatives.
Three, if human rights are to be mainstreamed within the United Nations, there has to be conceptual clarity about what human rights mainstreaming is understood to mean in this context. A study is needed on the main alternative definitions, the pros and cons of each, and a recommended conception of mainstreaming.
Four, building on this conceptual foundation, a practical framework for human rights mainstreaming in the United Nations would be very useful. ing. Also, the focus of the Understanding is development cooperation, and human rights mainstreaming is not confined to development. 247 For both reasons, it is timely to adopt a new Understanding, which would provide agencies and other UN bodies with a practical framework for human rights mainstreaming in their work. Based on this new generic framework, individual agencies may develop, in collaboration with OHCHR, their own more detailed mainstreaming requirements as they integrate human rights in their organizations. Some agencies have already taken steps in this direction. 248 Five, criteria are needed to assess whether or not human rights initiatives undertaken by agencies and other UN bodies are authentic from the human rights perspective. This section outlines one approach to this issue of quality control. 249 Finally, the focus of the second recommendation is assessment of the impact of UN human rights mainstreaming initiatives. However, more generally speaking, there is an urgent need to deepen research on, and evaluation of, the impact of human rights-shaped initiatives on individuals, communities, and populations. Today, there is a scarcity of such research and evaluation. 250 In the "era of declaration," with its focus on standard-setting and establishing international accountability mechanisms, gathering evidence of impact of human rights was not a priority. However, in the "era of implementation," evidence of the impact of human rights is important for at least two reasons. One, the full spectrum of human rights implementation depends upon engagement with a wide range of professions, some of which attach a lot of importance to evidence of impact of interventions. In these circumstances, it is helpful if there are evidential arguments supplementing (not replacing) the compelling normative arguments in favor of human rights. Two, there are often several different ways to implement a human right in which case it is helpful, but not necessarily determinative, to know which way has most impact. In the "era of implementation," research on, and evaluation of, the impact of human rights raises important methodological and other issues which require close attention.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To recap, this article considers the UN human rights system in the "era of implementation." The "full implementation" of human rights requires a wide range of laws, regulations, policies, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, plans, programs, projects, practices, and other interventions or initiatives, much of which falls beyond the institutional competence, expertise, and capacity of the UN human rights mainland consisting of the Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, High Commissioner, and OHCHR. Specialized agencies, funds, programs, and other UN bodies have an indispensable role to play if the UN system is to engage with the entire spectrum of implementation. The Human Rights Council and OHCHR are mandated to promote human rights mainstreaming which is a precondition for the "full implementation" of human rights. However, system-wide mainstreaming runs into the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy, which are woven into the fabric of the UN. Accordingly, human rights have to be owned and internalized by each agency and similar body; they cannot be successfully introduced from outside. There is today an emerging archipelago of human rights initiatives, lying beyond the UN human rights mainland, in agencies and elsewhere. This archipelago points the way forward for human rights in the "era of implementation." The emergence of the archipelago means the narrow conception of the UN human rights system has been overtaken by practice and is now outdated. The contemporary UN human rights system should be configured as the mainland and archipelago, and the article outlines three ways to promote its development. Although some parts of the archipelago have particular competence and expertise in ESCR, this does not mean that the mainland should focus on civil and political rights, and the archipelago should focus on ESCR. In keeping with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, both mainland and archipelago have to give due attention to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. 251 The contribution of the mainland may be towards the legislative end of the implementation spectrum and the contribution of the archipelago may be towards the executive end. 252 The mainland may focus on general legal guidance, quality control, and coherence, and the archi- The process to work out a mutually reinforcing relationship between mainland and archipelago is vitally important and has already begun. In this regard, the High Commissioner and OHCHR are doing much more than the Council. Within the mainland, Charter-bodies and treaty-bodies endeavor to reinforce each other's work; equally, the mainland and archipelago need to develop a strong symbiotic relationship. The crucial point is that the General Assembly's call for the "full implementation" and mainstreaming of human rights depends upon an effective UN human rights system encompassing both mainland and archipelago.
This article emphasizes that the Human Rights Council has to imagine and establish new working methods commensurate with its responsibilities in the "era of implementation." 254 The methods of the Commission on Human Rights, forged in the "era of declaration," are not adequate for the "full implementation" and effective mainstreaming of human rights. Business as usual will not do the job. However, the challenges presented by the "era of implementation" are not confined to the Council. They extend to all parts of the mainland, other UN bodies, national ministries, and elsewhere. New strategies are called for, accompanied by a new vision of the UN human rights system. The successful transition from the "era of declaration" to the "era of implementation" requires a paradigm shift in the United Nations approach to human rights.
In conclusion, since the 1940s, the UN has established the human rights mainland that remains both the core of the UN human rights system and the primary guardian of international human rights. However, the mainland does not have a monopoly on human rights and the UN human rights landscape is changing. While the Council has done little to fulfil its core mainstreaming mandate, the High Commissioner and OHCHR, working with their partners, deserve credit for advancing human rights mainstreaming across the UN system, despite major structural and financial constraints. Nonetheless, in the "era of implementation," the UN human rights system of mainland and archipelago requires new thinking, strategies, and methods. 253 . Of course, the "mainland" already has a number of accountability processes, such as UPR and periodic reporting to treaty-bodies, and the "archipelago" already has some, such as the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, see § VI. 254. See especially § VII.
